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IRREVERSIBILITY AND MONITORING IN DYNAMIC GAMES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
Ist Teil von
International economic review (Philadelphia), 2023-02, Vol.64 (1), p.387-412
Ort / Verlag
Philadelphia: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Erscheinungsjahr
2023
Quelle
BSC - Ebsco (Business Source Ultimate)
Beschreibungen/Notizen
This article provides experimental evidence on the impacts of irreversibility and imperfect monitoring on the efficiency and the equity of a repeated public goods game. We find that irreversibility and imperfect monitoring both lead to inefficient and unequal outcomes through different channels. Irreversibility lowers public goods contribution in earlier periods and makes the initial‐period contribution gap between two players long‐lasting. Imperfect monitoring hampers conditional cooperation and persistently reduces group contribution. A finite mixture estimation with conditional cooperators provides a coherent account of the treatment effects.