Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Duffley, Patrick

Titel

Logical Form – Not logical enough for logic, not linguistic enough for linguistics

Ist Teil von

• Journal of pragmatics, 2021-09, Vol.182, p.163-175

Ort / Verlag

Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V

Erscheinungsjahr

2021

Link zum Volltext

Quelle

Alma/SFX Local Collection

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• In mainstream generative grammar (MGG), Logical Form (LF) is at the same time a syntactic representation delivered by the grammar and a representation that can be truth-conditionally evaluated. Iacona (2018) argues however that formal logic raises a problem for MGG's intrinsicalist notion of LF: logic requires that the logical form assigned to a sentence should not depend solely on the sentence itself, but also on the logical relations the sentence bears to other propositions in the language, making logicians' logical form dependent on something outside the sentence. This paper argues that LF is also not linguistic enough for linguistics because it is modelled on formal logic rather than on careful analysis of natural language and the natural articulations of linguistic utterances. This leads to a misidentification of the basic linguistic unit, which is not the sentence, and a misanalysis of the sentence's basic structure. The conclusion argues that the only methodologically sound basis for linguistic analysis is not truth, nor the sentence that expresses it, but rather the means that allow the speaker to produce the utterance in the first place, the stable pairings of meaning and sound corresponding to the units that the speaker has stored in memory. •Argues that Logical Form is not logical enough for logic because it does not meet formal logic's requirement that the logical form of a sentence should depend on the relations that it bears to other propositions.•Argues that Logical Form is not linguistic enough for linguistics because it is modelled on formal logic rather than on careful analysis of the natural articulations of linguistic utterances.•Argues that Minimalism is wrong in treating sentences as pairings of sounds with meanings.•Redefines the semantics-progmatics interface as located between notional content that is stably associated with a linguistic sign and notional content that is not.•Argues that the only methodologically sound basis for linguistic analysis is not truth, but rather the stable pairings of meaning and sound corresponding to the linguistic units that the speaker has stored in memory.