Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Straßmaier, Stephan

Titel

Freedom of Will - Or Causal Determination of Actions?

Ort / Verlag

ProQuest Dissertations & Theses

Erscheinungsjahr

2005

Quelle

ProQuest Dissertations & Theses A&I

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• The aim of the treatise is the development of a will model which integrates the current most essential research results and contributes to an empirical scientific clarification of the will processes. At the beginning of the thesis, the question of causality and the determinism in nature is described and evaluated. The most essential results of brain research are then explained and partially discussed. Following this, is an explanation of the most essential brain research findings. The connectionistic attempts are discussed in particular, as well as anatomical, physiological and neurological subjects. How mind and consciousness can result from living brain matter is also discussed. Besides this, the essential results of emotion research as well as the experiments of Libet et al. are acknowledged. The neural brain wirings regarding will-events are also explained. Thereupon follows a more thorough representation of the body-soul-problem as it is discussed in the philosophy of the mind. Here the most fundamental positions are more closely examined. Afterwards, the development of the separate position of a Functional parallelism is reported. After this, the most essential philosophical statements and attempts with regards to the freedom-of-will-problem in view of the further development of the will-model are explained. The necessary psychological concepts and attempts are discussed in the next chapter. The most important current psychological will-models moreover are also discussed and criticized. In particular, the Rubikonmodel of Heckhausen, the Frame model of the action decision liberty of von Cranach, and Dörner’s Model of the antagonistic dialog are depicted thoroughly. The following chapter states the most probable form of the development of volitions and summarizes the statements made in the previous chapters. The human volition seems to be a complicated event which seems to be causally determined except in very rare (theoretically not excludable) and absolutely coincidental events. Our feeling of freedom of will is probably based (or a result) on the fact, that we cannot exactly determine our volitions, thoughts, actions and deeds beforehand and in addition don’t experience them as determined from an outer power (like Wittgenstein). There aren’t any scientific laws of nature which control us and dictate to us to do one thing or another. What the laws of nature dictate to us is what we do „voluntarily“ (like Pauen). Our liberty is therefore a liberty within the laws of nature. Furthermore, the position of John Locke, who said that our volition ability lies in the possibility to suspend actions, seems realistic - if one also sees the ability of suspension as a determined manner. We suppress impulses or rather actions because they simply aren’t strong enough to win against the other trends in the organism and not because we want it primarily so. One must imagine that the man just doesn’t work like a simple machine. Rather, highly complex neurological self organizing processes far from the thermodynamic balance take place within man (although also mechanically explicable components are available). Also volitional decisions can be regarded as changes of chaos theoretical attractors at corresponding neural variables in the connective network. Minor, real things from the inside or outside world could have an effect in generally modifying, by multifarious attractions, a healthy adult human neural system far from the thermodynamic balance. Our decisions are (at least partly) prepared consciously by perceptions and conscious intellectual content consisting of attitudes, aims, and values as well as Heckhausen’s Vornahmen. All of these have an effect on the formation of a decision. Besides this, unconscious motives and emotions can also have an effect. It was assumed that aspects of feelings and thoughts are of a complete connection. This view seems compatible with Damasio’s theory regarding somatic markers (for which there is evidence). Feelings are presumably the scale that is used to calculate(not mandatorily fixed)decisions. In the view of Ciompi feel-, think- and action-schemes actualize themselves in corresponding contexts, so that channel patterns also influence future conditions. Finally, it has been remarked that willful or non-volitional reactions can be caused by classic or operant conditioning. Observational learning in the sense of Bandura also has to be mentioned in connection with this by which action leading ideas can arise. The will model is characterized roughly by the exposition just mentioned and was after that given as a graphic justified and criticized in its construction also by connection with the results of brain research. A closer consideration of the fundamentals of the philosophy of ethics follows in the last main chapter as well as the same assessment of the developed will model together with an acknowledgement of German law. Finally, a consideration is attached to the implied conception of man.