Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Gamalerio, Matteo

Titel

Do national political parties matter? Evidence from Italian municipalities

Ist Teil von

• European Journal of Political Economy, 2020-06, Vol.63, p.101862, Article 101862

Ort / Verlag

Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V

Erscheinungsjahr

2020

Quelle

Worldwide Political Science Abstracts

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• Recently several countries have experienced a drop in popularity of national political parties, accompanied by the success of independent movements (e.g. “Civic Lists” in Italy). I exploit the success of “Civic Lists” in Italian municipalities and use them as a comparison group for party-affiliated politicians, to test whether national parties affect fiscal discipline. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), I show that party-affiliated mayors are more fiscally responsible: they run lower deficits, accumulate less debt and reduce expenditures. The effect is significant only for municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules. This suggests that national parties act as a substitute for fiscal rules in constraining politicians. Besides, I provide evidence that the discipline of party-affiliated politicians is linked to better career prospects: party-affiliated mayors have a higher probability of being re-elected and better chances of being promoted to higher levels of government. Alternative stories find less support in the data. •I show that party-affiliated mayors are more fiscally responsible than independents.•Party-affiliated mayors cut deficit by 1.1% points and accumulate less debt.•The effect is significant only for municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules.•This suggests that parties substitute fiscal rules in constraining politicians.•I show that political parties use career concerns to discipline local politicians.