Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Renneboog, Luc
• Zhao, Yang

Titel

Director networks, turnover, and appointments

Ist Teil von

• European financial management : the journal of the European Financial Management Association, 2020-01, Vol.26 (1), p.44-76

Ort / Verlag

Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Erscheinungsjahr

2020

Link zum Volltext

Quelle

EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• This paper analyzes the labor market (turnover and appointments) of executive and non‐executive directors by means of social network methodology. We find that directors with strong networks are able to obtain labor market information that enables them to leave their firm more easily for better opportunities. Networks also mitigate information asymmetry problems of external director appointments. Furthermore, the strong impact of indirect connections is in line with the ‘strength of the weak ties’ theory. The fact that direct connections are less important signifies that the connections to people that are close and local are likely to convey redundant information, whereas connections to distant individuals are more efficient in terms of information acquisition and labor market performance improvement.