Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Li, Xiang
• Han, Sun Sheng
• Wu, Hao

Titel

Urban consolidation, power relations, and dilapidated residential redevelopment in Mutoulong, Shenzhen, China

Ist Teil von

• Urban studies (Edinburgh, Scotland), 2019-10, Vol.56 (13), p.2802-2819

Ort / Verlag

London, England: Sage Publications, Ltd

Erscheinungsjahr

2019

Quelle

PAIS Index

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• Recent policy initiatives for urban development have changed the relationships among stakeholders in China’s urban consolidation processes. Building upon Giddens’ (Giddens A (1984) The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.) structuration theory and Ostrom’s (Ostrom E (2005) Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) institutional analysis and development thesis, this paper develops a power arena analytic framework, and uses it to examine the new power relations among the stakeholders in a dilapidated residential redevelopment project in Shenzhen. Our findings reveal that Shenzhen’s new approach incentivised the developer to frame a local decision-making structure which aligned the property owners into two broad groups: those who supported the developer, or cooperative, and those who disputed with the developer, or un-cooperative. Shenzhen’s new attempt was unable to balance power distribution between the main stakeholders and caused intense conflicts and poor project outcomes. A range of factors, including passive participation of residents in project preparation, weak mechanisms to curb speculation, and policy inconsistency associated with tiers of governments, were responsible for the poor performance. These findings contribute to the understanding of the complexity in power relations underlying urban development influenced by planning policy. 最近的城市发展政策举措改变了中国城市提质过程中利益相关者之间的关系。以吉登斯的结构理论（Giddens A (1984), The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press）和奥斯特罗姆的制度分析与发展命题（Ostrom E (2005) Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press）为基础，本文开发了一个权力竞技场分析框架，并用它来研究深圳一个棚户区改造项目中利益相关者之间的新的权力关系。我们的研究结果显示，深圳的新方法激励开发商构建一个本地决策结构，将业主分为两大类：支持开发商或合作的人，以及与开发商有争议或不合作的人。深圳的新尝试无法平衡主要利益相关者之间的权力分配，造成激烈的冲突和糟糕的项目结果。一系列因素，包括居民在项目准备中的被动参与、抑制投机的机制薄弱以及与多个政府层级相关的政策不一致，都是导致业绩不佳的原因。这些研究发现有助于理解受规划政策影响的城市发展背后的权力关系的复杂性。