Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Green, Edward J.
• Porter, Robert H.

Titel

Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information

Ist Teil von

• Econometrica, 1984-01, Vol.52 (1), p.87-100

Ort / Verlag

Menasha, Wis: The Econometric Society

Erscheinungsjahr

1984

Quelle

Alma/SFX Local Collection

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• Recent work in game theory has shown that, in principle, it may be possible for firms in an industry to form a self-policing cartel to maximize their joint profits. This paper examines the nature of cartel self-enforcement in the presence of demand uncertainty. A model of a noncooperatively supported cartel is presented, and the aspects of industry structure which would make such a cartel viable are discussed.