Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Cosimano, Thomas F.
• VAN Huyck, John B.

Titel

CENTRAL BANK SECRECY, INTEREST RATES, AND MONETARY CONTROL

Ist Teil von

• Economic inquiry, 1993-07, Vol.31 (3), p.370-382

Ort / Verlag

Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Erscheinungsjahr

1993

Quelle

Alma/SFX Local Collection

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• We construct a dynamic rational expectations model of the federal funds and deposit market that provides a rationale for central bank secrecy about current monetary aggregate objectives. In this analysis, the Trading Desk values secrecy because it reduces the influence of monetary control policy on interest rates. We then examine actual U.S. experience with monetary control and determine that the reserve bias predicted by the model is present in the data from 1978 to 1985. Finally, we demonstrate that central bank secrecy may not lower the value of commercial banks.