Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• LEE, B. D

Titel

The Knower Paradox Revisited

Ist Teil von

• Philosophical studies, 2000-03, Vol.98 (2), p.221-231

Ort / Verlag

Heidelberg: Kluwer Academic Publishers

Erscheinungsjahr

2000

Link zum Volltext

Quelle

SpringerLINK Contemporary (Konsortium Baden-Württemberg)

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• According to the so-called selfreference lemma, for any arbitrary formula of T whose only free variable is x, say (x), there exists a sentence U of T such that U $ ([rightanglenw]U[rightanglene]) is a theorem of T. By the self-reference lemma, then, there is some sentence P such that P $K([rightanglenw]P[rightanglene]) is a theorem ofT. [...]it is difficult to deny that there might be one who knows this true sentence at t. Therefore, contrary to Sorensens claim, I take it that Kt([rightanglenw]P $Kt([rightanglenw]P[rightanglene])[rightanglene]) can be true.Finally, one might argue that because making an inference from (B1) and (1) to P takes time, S is able to know only at t[prime] that P, where t < t[prime]. Since this reasoning is simple, S can have a justified true belief at t that P. Thus it follows by KI that Kt([rightanglenw]P[rightanglene]). [...]there is no definite way of determining whether or not S knows at t that P, and the puzzling behavior of the sentence Kt([rightanglenw]P[rightanglene]) is notably similar to the behavior of circular definition (2) above.As with circular definition (2), we can evaluate Kt([rightanglenw]P[rightanglene]) by taking an arbitrary extension of Ss knowledge at t as a hypothesis. [...]we will have the following revision pattern:P 2 [K]0; P 2/ [K]1; P 2 [K]2; P 2/ [K]3; ...If we take P as falling outside the extension of Ss knowledge at t at stage 0 as a hypothesis, on the other hand, we will have the following pattern:P 2/ [K]0; P 2 [K]1; P 2/ [K]2; P 2 [K]3; ...Therefore, P is unstable in all revision sequences, and so P is an epistemically pathological sentence for S at t. More importantly, theTHE KNOWER PARADOX REVISITED 231principles governing knowledge are consistent, because the distinction between revision stages allow us to avoid the contradiction arising from biconditional (1); that is, if P is true at a certain revision stage, P is true at a different stage.To conclude, the lesson of the Knower paradox is not that our notion of knowledge is structured into levels, nor that the Knower sentence is a knowledge blindspot. [...]the principles governing knowledge are consistent. [...]we can capture the pathological nature of the Knower sentence by the revision theory of knowledge sketched in this paper.REFERENCESAnderson, C. Anthony (1983): The Paradox of the Knower, Journal of Philosophy 80, 338355.Grim, Patrick (1988): Truth, Omniscience, and the Knower, PhilosophicalStudies 54, 941.