Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Pehl, Malte

Titel

The Debate on the Constructive Vote of No Confidence in India – Trading in Accountability for Stability?

Ist Teil von

• Verfassung und Recht in Übersee, 2016-01, Vol.49 (1), p.16-33

Ort / Verlag

Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG

Erscheinungsjahr

2016

Quelle

Worldwide Political Science Abstracts

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• In the effort to devise solutions to the problem of government instability and turnover, the Indian debate over the last 25 years has turned repeatedly, among other things, to a seemingly easy fix, namely the introduction of the constructive vote of no confidence along the lines of the model provided by the German Basic Law. This paper reviews the Indian debate and suggests four reasons for why such a change in the rules of procedure in the Indian legislature is not advisable or necessary. These are rooted in the diminishing need for instruments to curb government turnover at the Union level, in the argument that the debate about the vote of no confidence misreads the causes of instability and in the concern that such a change would potentially debilitate the legislatures ability to hold government accountable, thereby undermining the very essence of parliamentary democracy itself.