Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Freeman, Lauren
• Elpidorou, Andreas

Titel

Affectivity in Heidegger II: Temporality, Boredom, and Beyond

Ist Teil von

• Philosophy compass, 2015-10, Vol.10 (10), p.672-684

Ort / Verlag

Ithaca: Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Erscheinungsjahr

2015

Quelle

Alma/SFX Local Collection

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• In ‘Affectivity in Heidegger I: Moods and Emotions in Being and Time’, we explicated the crucial role that Martin Heidegger assigns to our capacity to affectively find ourselves in the world. There, our discussion was restricted to Division I of Being and Time (BT). Specifically, we discussed how Befindlichkeit as a basic existential (i.e., a structure of Dasein's being that constitutes both the manner in which Dasein exists and discloses itself) and moods as the ontic counterparts of Befindlichkeit (i.e., the pre‐reflective ways in which Dasein relates to and discloses the world) make circumspective engagement with the world possible. Indeed, according to Heidegger, it is primarily through moods that the world is ‘opened up’ and revealed to us as a world that is suffused with values and entities that already matter to us. In this companion essay, our aim is to expand our analysis of affectivity in the following ways: first, we revisit our discussion of Befindlichkeit in light of Heidegger's discussion of temporality in Division II of BT; second, we discuss the basic or fundamental mood (Grundstimmung) of boredom (Langeweile) and its ontological significance; we conclude by providing a brief characterization of how Heidegger's notion of mood changes in his later thinking.