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BibTeX
Interchange fee rate, merchant discount rate, and retail price in a credit card network: A game-theoretic analysis
Naval research logistics, 2012-10, Vol.59 (7), p.525-551
Guo, Hangfei
Leng, Mingming
Wang, Yulan
2012
Details
Autor(en) / Beteiligte
Guo, Hangfei
Leng, Mingming
Wang, Yulan
Titel
Interchange fee rate, merchant discount rate, and retail price in a credit card network: A game-theoretic analysis
Ist Teil von
Naval research logistics, 2012-10, Vol.59 (7), p.525-551
Ort / Verlag
Hoboken: Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
Erscheinungsjahr
2012
Link zum Volltext
Quelle
Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete
Beschreibungen/Notizen
We consider two game‐theoretic settings to determine the optimal values of an issuer's interchange fee rate, an acquirer's merchant discount rate, and a merchant's retail price in a credit card network. In the first setting, we investigate a two‐stage game problem in which the issuer and the acquirer first negotiate the interchange fee rate, and the acquirer and the retailer then determine their merchant discount rate and retail price, respectively. In the second setting, motivated by the recent US bill “H.R. 2695,” we develop a three‐player cooperative game in which the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant form a grand coalition and bargain over the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate. Following the cooperative game, the retailer makes its retail pricing decision. We derive both the Shapley value‐ and the nucleolus‐characterized, and globally‐optimal unique rates for the grand coalition. Comparing the two game settings, we find that the participation of the merchant in the negotiation process can result in the reduction of both rates. Moreover, the stability of the grand coalition in the cooperative game setting may require that the merchant should delegate the credit card business only to the issuer and the acquirer with sufficiently low operation costs. We also show that the grand coalition is more likely to be stable and the U.S. bill “H.R. 2695” is thus more effective, if the degree of division of labor in the credit card network is higher as the merchant, acquirer, and issuer are more specialized in the retailing, acquiring, and issuing operations, respectively. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012
Sprache
Englisch
Identifikatoren
ISSN: 0894-069X
eISSN: 1520-6750
DOI: 10.1002/nav.21505
Titel-ID: cdi_proquest_journals_1321965672
Format
–
Schlagworte
interchange fee rate
,
merchant discount rate
,
Nash bargaining
,
nucleolus
,
Shapley value
,
Stackelberg game
,
supermodularity
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