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The Philosophical review, 2013-01, Vol.122 (1), p.45-92
Ort / Verlag
Ithaca: Duke University Press
Erscheinungsjahr
2013
Link zum Volltext
Quelle
Duke University Press journals
Beschreibungen/Notizen
A dynamic semantics for epistemically modalized sentences is an attractive alternative to the orthodox view that our best theory of meaning ascribes to such sentences truth-conditions relative to what is known. This essay demonstrates that a dynamic theory about
and
offers elegant explanations of a range of puzzling observations about epistemic modals. The first part of the story offers a unifying treatment of disputes about epistemic modality and disputes about matters of fact while at the same time avoiding the complexities of alternative theories. The second part of the story extends the basic framework to cover some complicated data about retraction and the interaction between epistemic modality and tense. A comparison between the suggestion made in this essay and current versions of the orthodoxy is provided.