Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Azfar, Omar
• Shughart II, William F
• Razzolini, Laura

Titel

The logic of collective action

Ist Teil von

• THE ELGAR COMPANION TO PUBLIC CHOICE, 2001, p.59-82

Ort / Verlag

United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing

Erscheinungsjahr

2001

Quelle

Worldwide Political Science Abstracts

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• The contributions of Mancur Olson, particularly his (1965) rejection of the contention that large groups generally act in their collective interest, to public choice theory are considered. An overview of Olson's explanation for the large group's failure to act in the group's collective interest & conclusion that individual rationality does not necessitate collective rationality is offered. After demonstrating that nonwealthy members of a group exploit the resources of wealthier group members, a rational actor perspective is used to illustrate that increases in group size negatively affect the contributions of individual members & ambiguously influence the supply of public goods. Olson's explanation of the emergence of institutions that encourage collective action by promoting selective interests & Donald Wittman's (1995) analysis of democratic governments' efficiency are reviewed. The question of whether collective action can successfully combat worldwide environmental degradation is contemplated. Also explored are local collective solutions to public-good problems, Olson's (1982) claim that actors who get elected are proficient at organizing themselves around selective incentives, & why certain countries remain poor or achieve economic growth. It is concluded that Olson's (1965) work remains relevant & has important implications for future studies of national wealth & poverty. 1 Figure. J. W. Parker