Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Beckman, Ludvig

Titel

Democratic Inclusion and the State

Ist Teil von

• The Boundaries of Democracy, 2023, Vol.1, p.38-50

Auflage

1

Ort / Verlag

United Kingdom: Routledge

Erscheinungsjahr

2023

Quelle

Alma/SFX Local Collection

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• The all-subjected principle applies to the state only if the state claims the authority to regulate conduct by binding decisions. A distinction is made between the causal and the normative powers of the state. The authority claimed by the state derives from the normative powers conferred on it by the legal system. According to the consequent 'authority account', the state claims the legitimate legal authority to regulate conduct by binding decisions. This view is contrasted with two rival accounts: the brute force account and the moral account. The all-subjected principle applies to the state only if the state claims the authority to regulate conduct by binding decisions. The authority claimed by the state derives from the normative powers conferred on it by the legal system. Claims to democratic inclusion do not arise whenever a person is subject to 'laws' in this general sense: it would be awkward to insist that the subjects of the laws of gravity and the subjects of the laws of economics are entitled to democratic inclusion because they are subjected to 'laws'. The trouble is that neither prudential nor moral reasons for action offer a plausible basis for the all-subjected principle of democratic inclusion. The brute force account is unable to explain how the subject of the laws of the state can be subject to binding legal norms. Moral reasons for action are reasons that should be complied with; they are morally binding reasons.