Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Kuusela, Oskari
• Dain, Edmund
• Agam-Segal, Reshef

Titel

Wittgenstein, Ethics and Philosophical Clarification

Ist Teil von

• Wittgenstein's Moral Thought, 2018, p.37-65

Auflage

1

Ort / Verlag

United Kingdom: Routledge

Erscheinungsjahr

2018

Link zum Volltext

Quelle

Alma/SFX Local Collection

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• This chapter examines Wittgenstein’s early and later views on ethics in light of the development of his views on philosophical method. I begin by discussing certain continuous features of Wittgenstein’s views, in particular his conception that philosophy can offer only reminders and clarifications, not give a foundation for language, thought or ethics, with the first section introducing Wittgenstein’s notions of the personal character and groundlessness of ethics. The second section examines Wittgenstein’s early account of the possibility and nature of ethics and his account of a happy life, conceived in abstract and general terms as the problem of the relation of the will to reality. Following this, I discuss his later rejection of the early account, and its replacement with a different one that treats the problem of the relation of the will to reality as a particular aspect of ethics, rather than as its underlying essence. The final section is concerned with Wittgenstein’s views on ethical justification. I argue that. although Wittgenstein does regard ethical justifications as inconclusive, neither this nor the personal character and groundlessness of ethics imply relativism. This chapter examines Wittgenstein's early and later views on ethics in light of the development of his views on philosophical method. It discusses continuous features of Wittgenstein's views, in particular his conception that philosophy can offer only reminders and clarifications, not give a foundation for language, thought or ethics, with the section introducing Wittgenstein's notions of personal character and groundlessness of ethics. The chapter examines Wittgenstein's early account of the possibility and nature of ethics and his account of a happy life, conceived in abstract and general terms as the problem of the relation of the will to reality. It discusses his later rejection of early account, and its replacement with a different one that treats the problem of relation of the will to reality as a particular aspect of ethics, rather than as its underlying essence. The chapter argues that although Wittgenstein does regard ethical justifications as inconclusive, neither this nor personal character and groundlessness of ethics imply relativism.