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The Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as the necessity to position itself publicly in
regard to the conflict, has for decades presented a particular challenge to Saudi
Arabia’s external security and regime stability. In case of armed conflicts, the
Kingdom would have to expect a variety of direct and indirect security threats.
Much more problematic, however, has been the political quandary in which the
Saudi political leadership has increasingly found itself. The Saudi leadership has
been caught between its Arab-Islamic identity and its strategically vital, close
relationship with the United States, Israel’s staunchest ally and supporter. Since
the 1973 October War, a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, under
certain non-negotiable conditions, has been Saudi Arabia’s political interest.
Even before the October War, the Saudi government has, behind closed doors,
shown great readiness to compromise. At the beginning of the 1980s, the political consequences of the Arab-Israeli conflict increasingly ran counter to Saudi
Arabia’s policy interests. Egypt’s separate peace with Israel once again split the
Arab world and consequently led to Cairo’s expulsion from the Arab fold and
the strengthening of radical factions in the Arab world. Moreover, the EgyptianIsraeli peace treaty pushed into the distance the chances for the return of occupied Arab lands, including the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem. In light of these
developments, Saudi foreign policy underwent a paradigm change. Whereas
before, the Saudi leadership’s attempts to bring about a political solution of the
conflict were undertaken behind closed doors, most notably in dealings with the
United States, Riyadh now openly appeared as a conflict mediator. The result of
this policy change was the 1981 Fahd Peace Plan that, due to persistent Saudi
lobbying, eventually developed into the First Arab Peace Plan. Nearly 20 years
later, Saudi Arabia once again took the initiative towards a holistic political solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Again, several developments had motivated the
Saudi government to act decisively to bring about a peaceful conflict settlement.
Since the early fall of 2000, the Second Intifada and the brutal Israeli actions
against the Palestinian people had escalated the Arab-Israeli conflict. Any
chances for a peaceful conflict resolution that might have existed after the 1993
Oslo Accords and the Camp David talks between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak and Palestinian President Yasser Arafat in early 2000 had disappeared.
Moreover, the tragic events of September 11, 2001 had seriously burdenedU.S.–Saudi relations. Positive steps towards a solution of the conflict between
the Arab states and the close U.S. ally Israel promised to greatly improve Riyadh’s relations with Washington. Consequently, Saudi Arabia presented an
amended version of its earlier peace proposal, the Abdullah Plan. Once again,
the Saudi leadership lobbied for its peace initiative amongst the remaining Arab
and Islamic states. In the end, both the Arab League and the Organization of the
Islamic Conference adopted a slightly reworded version of the Abdullah Plan as
the Second Arab Peace Initiative and the first Pan-Islamic peace proposal
respectively.
This chapter will highlight Saudi Arabia’s policy interests with regard to the
Arab-Israeli conflict and shed light on the Kingdom’s policy stance over the past
decades. The analysis will particularly scrutinize Saudi Arabia’s attempts to
bring about a peaceful settlement between all conflict parties. Until this day, the
Kingdom does not maintain diplomatic relations with the State of Israel. Hence,
unlike the United States, the European Union, and others, the Saudi government
has not mediated directly between Israel on the one side and the Palestinians and
other Arab parties directly involved in the conflict on the other. What the
Kingdom has done instead is to lobby the Arab and Islamic state community for
a peace offer to Israel based on a far-reaching compromise.