Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Le Breton, Michel
• Weber, Shlomo
• Vind, Karl
• Schultz, Christian

Titel

Group Formation with Heterogeneous Feasible Sets

Ist Teil von

• Institutions, Equilibria and Efficiency, 2006, Vol.25, p.295-315

Ort / Verlag

Germany: Springer Berlin / Heidelberg

Erscheinungsjahr

2006

Quelle

Alma/SFX Local Collection

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• In this paper we consider a model of group formation where group of individuals may have different feasible sets. We focus on two polar cases, increasing returns, when the set of feasible alternatives increases if a new member joins the group, and decreasing returns, when a new member has an opposite effect and reduces the number of alternatives available for the enlarged group. We consider two notions, stability and strong stability of group structures, that correspond to Nash and Strong Nash equilibrium of the associated non-cooperative game. We prove existence results for various classes of environments and also investigate the link between dimensionality of feasible sets and the existence of stable structures.