Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Tieszen, Richard

Titel

Gödel's Path from the Incompleteness Theorems (1931) To Phenomenology (1961)

Ist Teil von

• The bulletin of symbolic logic, 1998-06, Vol.4 (2), p.181-203

Ort / Verlag

New York, USA: Cambridge University Press

Erscheinungsjahr

1998

Quelle

Alma/SFX Local Collection

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• In a lecture manuscript written around 1961 (Gödel *1961/?), Gödel describes a philosophical path from the incompleteness theorems to Husserl's phenomenology. It is known that Gödel began to study Husserl's work in 1959 and that he continued to do so for many years. During the 1960s, for example, he recommended the sixth investigation of Husserl's Logical Investigations to several logicians for its treatment of categorial intuition (Wang 1997, p. 164). While Gödel may not have been satisfied with what he was able to obtain from philosophy and Husserl's phenomenology, he nonetheless continued to recommend Husserl's work to logicians as late as the 1970s. In this paper I present and discuss the kinds of arguments that led Gödel to the work of Husserl. Among other things, this should help to shed additional light on Gödel's philosophical and scientific ideas and to show to what extent these ideas can be viewed as part of a unified philosophical outlook. Some of the arguments that led Gödel to Husserl's work are only hinted at in Gödel's 1961 paper, but they are developed in much more detail in Gödel's earlier philosophical papers (see especially 1934, *193?, 1944, 1947, *1951, *1953/59). In particular, I focus on arguments concerning Hilbert's program and an early version of Carnap's program. §1. Some ideas from phenomenology . Since Husserl's work is not generally known to mathematical logicians, it may be helpful to mention briefly a few details about his background.