Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Chen, Xiaojie
• Szolnoki, Attila
• Broom, Mark

Titel

Punishment and inspection for governing the commons in a feedback-evolving game

Ist Teil von

• PLoS computational biology, 2018-07, Vol.14 (7), p.e1006347-e1006347

Ort / Verlag

United States: Public Library of Science

Erscheinungsjahr

2018

Quelle

MEDLINE

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members. While cooperator players restrain themselves and consider the proper state of resources, defectors demand more than their supposed share for a higher payoff. To avoid the tragedy of the common state, punishing the latter group seems to be an adequate reaction. This conclusion, however, is less straightforward when we acknowledge the fact that resources are finite and even a renewable resource has limited growing capacity. To clarify the possible consequences, we consider a coevolutionary model where beside the payoff-driven competition of cooperator and defector players the level of a renewable resource depends sensitively on the fraction of cooperators and the total consumption of all players. The applied feedback-evolving game reveals that beside a delicately adjusted punishment it is also fundamental that cooperators should pay special attention to the growing capacity of renewable resources. Otherwise, even the usage of tough punishment cannot save the community from an undesired end.