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Super-Experienced Bidders in First-Price Common-Value Auctions: Rules of Thumb, Nash Equilibrium Bidding, and the Winner's Curse
Ist Teil von
The review of economics and statistics, 2001-08, Vol.83 (3), p.408-419
Ort / Verlag
238 Main St., Suite 500, Cambridge, MA 02142-1046, USA: MIT Press
Erscheinungsjahr
2001
Link zum Volltext
Quelle
EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate
Beschreibungen/Notizen
Super-experienced bidders have learned to overcome the winner's curse but still earn less than 50% of Nash equilibrium profits. Subjects deviate from the complicated Nash strategy, employing piecewise-linear bid functions that are capable, in principle, of generating an equilibrium with average profits at or above the Nash benchmark. Thus, limited computational abilities alone cannot account for the reduced earnings. Further, subjects are far from best responding within this family of piecewise-linear bid functions. Alternative factors contributing to these reduced earnings are explored.