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I SAW THE SIGN: NIFLA V. BECERRA AND INFORMED CONSENT TO ABORTION
Ist Teil von
Columbia law review, 2019-12, Vol.119 (8), p.2279-2318
Ort / Verlag
New York: Columbia Law Review Association, Inc
Erscheinungsjahr
2019
Link zum Volltext
Quelle
PAIS Index
Beschreibungen/Notizen
In 2018, the Supreme Court held in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA) that requiring a crisis pregnancy center to place a sign in its waiting room alerting people to available abortion services elsewhere violated the First Amendment. Abortion providers are often faced with similar requirements—but the Court’s cursory treatment of the First Amendment in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey left their rights in flux for decades. Commentators lamented that the Court saw fit to protect a crisis pregnancy center from state-written compelled speech but left abortion providers without the same constitutional protections. This Note argues that, far from exempting abortion providers from its holding, NIFLA in fact provides the first Supreme Court guidance since Casey for interpreting state informed consent statutes that implicate the speech of abortion providers. The reasoning of NIFLA compels the conclusion that “pure speech” for the crisis pregnancy center must be “pure speech” for the abortion provider.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of the law of compelled speech, abortion jurisprudence, and how these two disparate areas of the law have converged in the courts prior to NIFLA. Part II argues that NIFLA should force lower courts to reckon with what constitutes “conduct” in the abortion context and what must constitute “pure speech.” Part III uses NIFLA’s language to develop a framework to assess whether a restriction regulates conduct or speech in the abortion context and demonstrates how such a framework could be applied to ubiquitous informed consent restrictions passed in states across the country.