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Separation of ownership from control and merger and acquisition
Ist Teil von
2014 International Conference on Management Science & Engineering 21th Annual Conference Proceedings, 2014, p.1243-1250
Ort / Verlag
IEEE
Erscheinungsjahr
2014
Quelle
IEEE/IET Electronic Library
Beschreibungen/Notizen
We construct a theoretical model to investigate how ultimate controlling owners use takeovers to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders and further exam whether the separation of ownership from control results in value-destroying mergers and acquisitions empirically. We find that: First, the merger premium is higher for firms with greater separation of ownership and control in unconnected M&As and lower for firms with greater separation of ownership from control in connected M&As. Second, greater separation of ownership from control will result in lower value creation (lower CAR and lower change in operation performance). Our results are consistent with the views that the ultimate controlling owners have motivations and powers to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Besides, we provide additional evidence to managerial agency, hubris and market timing hypotheses which interpret what drives value-destroying mergers and acquisitions.