Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Huertas Celdran, Alberto
• Miguel Sanchez Sanchez, Pedro
• von der Assen, Jan
• Schenk, Timo
• Bovet, Gerome
• Martinez Perez, Gregorio
• Stiller, Burkhard

Titel

RL and Fingerprinting to Select Moving Target Defense Mechanisms for Zero-Day Attacks in IoT

Ist Teil von

• IEEE transactions on information forensics and security, 2024, Vol.19, p.5520-5529

Ort / Verlag

IEEE

Erscheinungsjahr

2024

Quelle

IEEE Electronic Library (IEL)

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• Moving Target Defense (MTD) is a promising approach to mitigate attacks by dynamically altering target attack surfaces. Still, selecting suitable MTD techniques for zero-day attacks is an open challenge. Reinforcement Learning (RL) could be an effective approach to optimize the MTD selection through trial and error, but the literature fails when i) evaluating the performance of RL and MTD solutions in real-world scenarios, ii) studying whether behavioral fingerprinting is suitable for RL, and iii) calculating the consumption of resources in single-board computers (SBC). Thus, the work at hand proposes an online RL-based framework that learns correct MTD mechanisms mitigating heterogeneous zero-day attacks in SBC. The framework considers behavioral fingerprinting to represent SBCs' states and RL to learn MTD techniques that mitigate each malicious state. It has been deployed on a real IoT crowdsensing scenario with a Raspberry Pi acting as a spectrum sensor. The Raspberry Pi has been infected with different samples of command and control malware, rootkits, and ransomware to later select between four existing MTD techniques. A set of experiments demonstrated the suitability of the framework to learn proper MTD techniques mitigating all attacks (except a harmfulness rootkit) while consuming < 1 MB of storage, <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">\approx 10 </tex-math></inline-formula>% of RAM, and negligible CPU.