Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Chouayakh, Ayman
• Bechler, Aurélien
• Amigo, Isabel
• Nuaymi, Loutfi
• Maillé, Patrick

Titel

A truthful ascending auction mechanism for dynamic allocation of LSA spectrum blocks

Ist Teil von

• Netnomics, 2021-06, Vol.22 (1), p.27-52

Ort / Verlag

New York: Springer US

Erscheinungsjahr

2021

Quelle

Alma/SFX Local Collection

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• Licensed Shared Access (LSA) is a new sharing approach that aims to optimize the use of the 2.3-2.4 Ghz frequency band in order to support the deployment of 5G systems. Under LSA, Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) can share the 2.3-2.4 band with the incumbent of that band under some guarantees, specified in a license attributed by the regulator. In this paper, we focus on ascending auctions to allocate and price licenses. We first show how to implement an ascending version of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism in the LSA context, but highlight that it may introduce some computational complexity problems. We therefore propose another ascending mechanism, called C-LSA, based on the clinching approach. We also design the one-shot equivalent (in terms of allocations and payments) of C- LSA that we use to compare the performance of VCG and C-LSA through simulations. Our simulations suggest that C-LSA is an interesting candidate to allocate LSA licenses, since the mechanism yields considerably larger revenues than VCG, for a very limited loss of allocation efficiency (around 4%).