Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Madani, Kaveh
• Farhidi, Faraz
• Gholizadeh, Sona

Titel

Bargaining Power in Cooperative Resource Allocations Games

Ist Teil von

• Algorithms, 2022-12, Vol.15 (12), p.445

Ort / Verlag

Basel: MDPI AG

Erscheinungsjahr

2022

Link zum Volltext

Quelle

Electronic Journals Library

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• Cooperative game theory provides an appropriate framework to assess the likelihood of conflict resolution, encourage cooperation among parties, and determine each party’s share in resource sharing conflicts. In calculating the fair and efficient allocation of the incremental benefits of cooperation, cooperative game theory methods often do not consider the exogenous bargaining powers of the players based on factors, that are external to the game, such as their political, economic, and military powers. This study reformulates three well-known cooperative game theory methods, namely, Nash-Harsanyi, Shapley, and Nucleolus, to account for the exogenous bargaining powers of the players in cooperative games. Using the Caspian Sea international conflict as an example, this paper shows how the negotiators’ exogenous bargaining power can change the outcome of resource sharing games. The proposed weighted cooperative game theory approach can help determine practical resolutions for real-world conflicts in which the exogenous powers of players can have a significant influence on the outcome of negotiations.