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EXPORTS AND CREDIT CONSTRAINTS UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM CHINA
Ist Teil von
The review of economics and statistics, 2014-10, Vol.96 (4), p.729-744
Ort / Verlag
Cambridge: The MIT Press
Erscheinungsjahr
2014
Quelle
MIT Press Journals
Beschreibungen/Notizen
This paper examines why credit constraints for domestic and exporting firms arise in a setting where banks do not observe firms' productivities. To maintain incentive compatibility, banks lend below the amount that firms need for optimal production. The longer time needed for export shipments induces a tighter credit constraint on exporters than on purely domestic firms. In our application to Chinese firms, we find that the credit constraint is more stringent as a firm's export share grows, as the time to ship for exports is lengthened, and as there is greater dispersion of firms' productivities, reflecting more incomplete information.