Sie befinden Sich nicht im Netzwerk der Universität Paderborn. Der Zugriff auf elektronische Ressourcen ist gegebenenfalls nur via VPN oder Shibboleth (DFN-AAI) möglich. mehr Informationen...
Philosophy and phenomenological research, 2001-01, Vol.62 (1), p.1-32
Ort / Verlag
Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Erscheinungsjahr
2001
Link zum Volltext
Quelle
Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete
Beschreibungen/Notizen
Anthropologists often claim to have understood an ethical outlook that they nevertheless believe is largely false. Some moral philosophers-e.g., Susan Hurley-argue that this claim is incoherent because understanding an ethical outlook necessarily involves believing it to be largely true. To reach this conclusion, they apply an argument of Donald Davidson's to the ethical case. My central aim is to defend the coherence of the anthropologists' claim against this argument. To begin with, I specify a candidate-language that contains a significant number of alien thick descriptions. A thick description is a term that has both descriptive and evaluative content, e.g., "courageous." I then argue that, because of its alien thick descriptions, this candidate-language cannot be interpreted by someone who adheres to the strictures of Davidson's account of interpretation. To complete my criticism, I demonstrate that the meaningfulness of this candidate-language cannot be impugned on Davidson's own terms. This involves showing that an interpreter's correctly assigning truth-conditions, expressed in her own language, to sentences featuring alien thick descriptions is consistent with her believing those sentences to be false.