Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Barreto, Sergio
• Pignati, Marco
• Dan, Gyorgy
• Le Boudec, Jean-Yves
• Paolone, Mario

Titel

Undetectable Timing-Attack on Linear State-Estimation by Using Rank-1 Approximation

Ist Teil von

• IEEE transactions on smart grid, 2018-07, Vol.9 (4), p.3530-3542

Ort / Verlag

IEEE

Erscheinungsjahr

2018

Quelle

IEEE Electronic Library Online

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• Smart-grid applications based on synchrophasor measurements have recently been shown to be vulnerable to timing attacks. A fundamental question is whether timing attacks could remain undetected by bad-data detection algorithms used in conjunction with state-of-the-art situational-awareness state estimators. In this paper, we analyze the detectability of timing attacks on linear state-estimation. We show that it is possible to forge delay attacks that are undetectable. We give a closed form for an undetectable attack; it imposes two phase offsets to two or more synchrophasor-based measurement units that can be translated to synchrophasors' time delays. We also propose different methods for combining two-delays attacks to produce a larger impact. We simulate the attacks on a benchmark power-transmission grid, we show that they are successful and can lead to physical grid damage. To prove undetectability, we use classic bad-data detection techniques such as the largest normalized residual and the <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX">{\chi ^{2}} </tex-math></inline-formula>-test.