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Implementing coordination contracts in a manufacturer Stackelberg dual-channel supply chain
Ist Teil von
Omega (Oxford), 2012-10, Vol.40 (5), p.571-583
Ort / Verlag
Kidlington: Elsevier Ltd
Erscheinungsjahr
2012
Link zum Volltext
Quelle
Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete
Beschreibungen/Notizen
We examine a manufacturer's pricing strategies in a dual-channel supply chain, in which the manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader and the retailer is a follower. We show the conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer both prefer a dual-channel supply chain. We examine the coordination schemes for a dual-channel supply chain and find that a manufacturer's contract with a wholesale price and a price for the direct channel can coordinate the dual-channel supply channel, benefiting the retailer but not the manufacturer. We illustrate how such a contract with a complementary agreement, such as a two-part tariff or a profit-sharing agreement, can coordinate the dual-channel supply chain and enable both the manufacturer and the retailer to be a win–win.
► We examine a Stackelberg manufacturer's pricing strategies in a dual-channel supply chain. ► Conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer both prefer a dual-channel are indentified. ► Coordination scheme for a dual-channel supply chain is proposed. ► With complementary agreements, coordinating contracts can enable a win–win in a dual-channel.