Automatica (Oxford), 2000, Vol.36 (1), p.135-139
2000
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- Autor(en) / Beteiligte
- Titel
- Feedback Nash equilibria in the scalar infinite horizon LQ-game
- Ist Teil von
- Automatica (Oxford), 2000, Vol.36 (1), p.135-139
- Ort / Verlag
- Elsevier Ltd
- Erscheinungsjahr
- 2000
- Quelle
- Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals
- Beschreibungen/Notizen
- In this note we consider linear stationary feedback Nash equilibria of the scalar linear-quadratic differential game. The planning horizon considered is assumed to be infinite. We present both necessary and sufficient conditions on the system parameters for the existence of a unique solution of the associated algebraic Riccati equations (ARE) that stabilizes the closed-loop system. For the case of more solutions, singleton-valued refinements of the equilibrium concept are studied.
- Sprache
- Englisch
- Identifikatoren
- ISSN: 0005-1098eISSN: 1873-2836DOI: 10.1016/S0005-1098(99)00119-3Titel-ID: cdi_crossref_primary_10_1016_S0005_1098_99_00119_3
- Format
- –
- Schlagworte
- Feedback Nash equilibrium, Linear quadratic games, Riccati equations, Solvability conditions