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A new authenticated key agreement for session initiation protocol
International journal of communication systems, 2012-01, Vol.25 (1), p.47-54
Xie, Qi
2012
Volltextzugriff (PDF)
Details
Autor(en) / Beteiligte
Xie, Qi
Titel
A new authenticated key agreement for session initiation protocol
Ist Teil von
International journal of communication systems, 2012-01, Vol.25 (1), p.47-54
Ort / Verlag
Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
Erscheinungsjahr
2012
Quelle
Wiley Online Library - AutoHoldings Journals
Beschreibungen/Notizen
SUMMARY The session initiation protocol (SIP) is an authentication protocol used in 3G mobile networks. In 2009, Tsai proposed an authenticated key agreement scheme as an enhancement to SIP. Yoon et al. later pointed out that the scheme of Tsai is vulnerable to off‐line password guessing attack, Denning–Sacco attack, and stolen‐verifier attack and does not support perfect forward secrecy (PFS). Yoon et al. further proposed a new scheme with PFS. In this paper, we show that the scheme of Yoon et al. is still vulnerable to stolen‐verifier attack and may also suffer from off‐line password guessing attack. We then propose several countermeasures for solving these problems. In addition, we propose a new security‐enhanced authentication scheme for SIP. Our scheme also maintains low computational complexity. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. In 2010, Yoon et al. proposed a security‐enhanced scheme for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) which is an authentication protocol used in 3G mobile networks. In this paper, we showed that Yoon et al.'s SIP is vulnerable to off‐line password guessing attack and stolen‐verifier attack, and proposed several countermeasures for defending against these attacks. In addition, we proposed a new security‐enhanced scheme for SIP which not only defends against the attacks mentioned above, but can also maintain the efficiency of the scheme.
Sprache
Englisch
Identifikatoren
ISSN: 1074-5351
eISSN: 1099-1131
DOI: 10.1002/dac.1286
Titel-ID: cdi_crossref_primary_10_1002_dac_1286
Format
–
Schlagworte
authentication protocol
,
key agreement
,
password guessing attacks
,
session initiation protocol
,
stolen-verifier attacks
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