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Agent-zákazník problém v distribuci finančních produktů
Ist Teil von
Politická ekonomie, 2018, Vol.66 (4), p.491-507
Ort / Verlag
Prague: Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze
Erscheinungsjahr
2018
Link zum Volltext
Quelle
Electronic Journals Library
Beschreibungen/Notizen
The paper deals with the agent-principal problem (adverse selection) in the distribution of
investment products. Utilising data from the Czech financial market, a linear model with mixed
effects was constructed, evaluating the relationship between remuneration of individual agents
and quality-costs of the products they recommend. The results were structured for different
organisational setups. We have found that in some less important environments from the market
perspective (small and medium multi-level marketing networks, small and big pools, medium and
big flat firms), there is a negative association between quality-cost of the contracted product and
the amount of commission paid out to the agent. This indicates potential consumer detriment. In
the majority of organisations dominating the industry, however, the direction of this relationship
is positive in nature or statistically insignificant. Hence, the systemic potential for instigating
the adverse selection was not detected in a major part of the market, bringing up regulatory
implications in the conflict of interest and inducements area.