Details

Autor(en) / Beteiligte

• Sánchez, Teresa Dabán
• Symansky, Steven A
• Milesi-Ferretti, Gian-Maria
• Detragiache, Enrica
• Bella, Gabriel Di

Titel

Rules-based fiscal policy in France, Germany, Italy and Spain

Ort / Verlag

International Monetary Fund

Erscheinungsjahr

2003

Link zum Volltext

Quelle

Alma/SFX Local Collection

Beschreibungen/Notizen

• Fiscal rules can help to counteract the deficits and spending biases that too often originate in the political process. Rules that constrain spending--rather than the balance--allow fiscal policy to be countercyclical. Yet the design of effective spending rules is by no means straightforward. Should a rule be real or nominal? How comprehensive should the definition of spending be? What safeguards ensure the credibility of a rule? How do rules work in decentralized systems where regions and states are partially autonomous? France, Germany, Italy, and Spain--countries that could benefit from more emphasis on fiscal rules to constrain spending--are explored here as case studies.